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Abstract. This paper studies the impact of governmental transparency on the political business cycle. The 
literature on electoral cycles finds evidence that cycles depend on the stage of the economy. However, we show a 
reliance of the cycle on transparency. We use data for G7 countries and compare it with less developed OECD 
countries. Our theory states that transparency reduces the political cycles due to peer pressure and by voting outs. 
We confirm the theory with an econometric assessment of 34 countries from 1970 to 2012. We discover smaller 
cycles in countries with a higher transparency, especially in G7-countries. 
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1. Introduction 
In the past decades, governments develop more and more transparency measures with a growing relevance 
of the Internet. During the US presidential election of 2012 or the election campaign of the German Bundestag in 
2013, the Internet and social media played an important role too. In addition, even political events such as the 
fall of Mubarak in Egypt or the Syrian revolution in April 2011, has demonstrated the importance of social 
media. The worldwide and mobile access is a new source of information and a catalyst for more transparency. 
Parallel to these developments, governments used the Internet for their own sake. The key word is ‘e-
governance’. E-governance means that governments use the information and communications technologies (ICT) 
to interact with citizens and voters. This includes but is not limited to two-way information flow, efficient 
processing of administrative issues and the delivery of various services. The ultimate goals of e-governance are 
that, at the end, everyone gets a better overview what governments do. This is strengthening political procedures 
and participation. 
Earlier research in this field demonstrated that economic welfare is influenced through actions of 
governments. There is empirical evidence that politicians focus more on times shortly before elections. They try 
to manipulate the voters’ decision by promising higher economic well-being after elections. This is commonly 
known as the 'political budget cycle' (PBC). Taking into account the existence of political cycles, we study the 
impact of increasing transparency to the cycles. We demonstrate that recent developments via the Internet and 
social media have changed the size of the budget cycles. To our knowledge, this paper is the first that studies the 
question of the budget cycles and transparency as well as e-governance. We evaluate this by using data for 34 
OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) countries over the time period from 1970 to 
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2012. We find evidence which is confirmed by the empirical results that higher transparency mitigates the 
political cycles, measured with the standard deviation and amplitude. 
In the section 2, we review the literature. In section 3, we develop our idea and derive a econometric 
equation. Next, we examine the empirical results in sections 4 and 5. Section 6, concludes the paper. 
2. Literature Review 
Nordhaus [1], Alesina [2] and Persson & Tabellini [3] are the main contributors to literature regarding the 
political budget cycle. Contrary to our expectations, however, almost no articles connect the political budget 
cycle with transparency and e-governance measures. 
In 1975, Nordhaus [4] came up with the idea of the political budget cycle. Using the Philips curve trade-off 
as starting point, he asked which decisions politicians take and how governments ‘chose between present welfare 
and future welfare’ [4], especially shortly before elections. As a result of his work, he found that early phases of 
a government's term show high unemployment rates and low public expenditure, whereas later phases of the 
election term show low unemployment rates and increased public expenditure. Around this finding, a huge 
literature developed, which we will further extend with the paper on hand. We use a sample of 34 OECD 
countries to find a relationship between the magnitude of a political business and transparency in the respective 
economy. In order to do so we mainly introduce e-governance and further transparency measures. 
In a more detailed approach, Paldam [5] focuses on a government's actions while they are elected power. He 
sees a ‘stable’ government as one that will complete the whole election period and assumes that their political 
actions are determined before they come to power. As consequence, ‘a restrictive policy in the beginning of an 
election period [is] followed by an expansive phase later on’ [5]. As governments want to be re-elected, they 
make unpopular decisions in an early phase of the electoral cycle and strive to please their voters shortly before 
elections. Rogoff [6] calls such behaviour ‘a consumption binge, in which taxes are cut, transfers are raised and 
government spending is distorted towards projects with high immediate visibility’. Although the direct economic 
well-being is not directly impacted by monetary and fiscal actions, voters are influenced by these actions [7].  
Drazen [8] concludes that ‘although there is (...) agreement that aggregate economic conditions affect 
election outcomes (...), there is significant disagreement on about whether there is opportunistic manipulation’. 
In short, this means that it is unclear whether the behaviour of voters is at all impacted by the very small effects 
on the economic situation that politicians action's can have. 
Even if most of the voters are informed that the government wants to be re-elected and therefore pleases 
them, governments tend to follow an expansive fiscal policy anyway [9]. In addition, further empirical literature 
finds the political budget cycle being less in developing countries [9]; [10]. 
Several authors including but not limited to Nordhaus [4] and MacRae [11] find evidence for a political 
budget cycle. Others, like McCallum [12], Alesina & Robini [13] and more cannot find sufficient evidence and 
therefore question the general existence of these cycles. According to Sargent & Wallace [14] boom phases 
cannot be artificially created whenever politicians need them. Rogoff & Sibert [15] assume that voters are 
rational being and explain the temporary presence of political budget cycles with timely limited information 
asymmetries.  
During the beginnings of the Internet, its influence on the political budget cycle was negligible. The mobile 
age, however, and especially the emergence of web 2.0, e-governance and online election campaigns had a 
significant impact on the political budget cycle. Alt & Lassen [16] find that ‘the evidence linking transparency 
and fiscal policy outcomes is less compelling’. Based on current observations and developments, this hypothesis 
is challenged by the paper on hand. The Arabic spring is one of several recent events that demonstrated that 
social media, mobile access to the Internet, increasing e-governance and developing public transparency are 
increasingly influencing public and political discussions.  
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Several assumptions are a prerequisite for analysing the available data. Politicians strive to be re-elected 
again as their goal is to keep and increase their power. Consequently, they often decide in favour of their voters. 
Moreover, voters only goal is to improve their own economic situation. To do so, they always behave rationally. 
Lastly, we assume that the economy can sufficiently be influenced by political actions. Nordhaus [1] takes the 
same assumptions and adds that ‘many politico-economic models assume that voters do not possess all available 
information’ [1]. Although we generally agree with this assumption, we add that political decisions become 
more transparent through the rapid development of the Internet. This development also influences the forward-
looking behaviour of voters and changes the way decisions are made. Starting with Nordhaus' classical theory, 
our theoretical framework extends the budget cycle through taking into account all the points mentioned. From a 
theoretical standpoint it is easily possible to explain that increasing transparency and e-governance will mitigate 
the political budget cycle.  
3. Data and Econometric Methodology 
Although fiscal transparency was a key component in the discussion about public finance for many years, 
still no unified measure for it exists. In the existing literature, various definitions and measurement for 
transparency can be found. On the one hand, ‘government transparency’ is done through expert ratings [17]. On 
the other hand, various international organisations developed their individual indices for transparency. At first, 
the paper on hand applies several standard measurements. In addition to that, Google search data is used. Using 
this type of data is completely new approach which cannot be found in literature so far.  
Our data sample includes 34 OECD countries. They are split in the G7 countries (Canada, France, Germany, 
Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States) and Australia on the one hand. On the other hand, we 
classify Austria, Belgium, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, 
Israel, Republic of Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak 
Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and Turkey as other-countries. The data we apply is 
comparable to what is used in the literature for the last decades. We use various typical economic indicators like 
unemployment rate, disposable income, real and nominal GDP, public expenditure, debt and public deficit. With 
regard to election we use data from presidential or federal parliamentary elections, depending on which election 
is more significant and important in the respective country. Wherever we have the data on hand, it is used for the 
years from 1970 to 2012.  
What was called ‘clarity of responsibility’ by Powell & Whitten [18] can be created through increased 
transparency [16]. The results of a politician’s action and its results can be more easily affirmed if sufficient 
transparency is in place. Through increased transparency, political actions are more visible and apparent to a 
broad set of people. According to Kopits & Craig [19] transparency is ‘openness toward the public at large about 
government structure and functions, fiscal policy intentions, public sector accounts, and projections. It involves 
ready access to reliable, comprehensive, timely, understandable, and internationally comparable information on 
government activities … so that the electorate and financial markets can accurately assess the government’s 
financial position and the true costs and benefits of government activities, including their present and future 
economic and social implications’. Alt & Lassen [20] use four different categories to define a transparency index. 
In our case, various variables are used to get a measure for transparency. People need access to the Internet in 
order to use e-governance. We capture that through broadband subscriptions per 100 inhabitants. Moreover, the 
UN E-Government surveys from 2004 onwards include a so-called e-participation index. This index includes 
how information is provided to the citizens, how citizens can give their input towards public services and 
policies and finally how much power citizens have in improving service components and developing new 
policies. Finally, we use Google search data. Thereby, we not only measure transparency in a new way but also 
extend the existing literature through taking a new approach. Our expectations with regard to how transparency 
changes the political budget cycle are similar to the existing literature: First, policy information should be made 
more accessible through procedures with increased transparency. Second, people are willing to commit more to 
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necessary reforms. Third, decisions with regard to new policy will be publicly more explained and justified. 
Fourth, each action of politicians will be verified by independent citizens. The data used for that comes from an 
analysis of Google Trends. Main keywords including election, government and others were applied for all 34 
OECD countries over a ten year time.  
We estimate a PBC model, according to the following equation 
        ∑          
 
   
            
where      is the cycle in country   in year  ,    is a country fixed effect,      is an election dummy, and      is 
an error term in country   and at time  . The term        is a lag variable and contains also control variables. As 
long as the dummy is exogenous, the OLS estimation is unbiased. 
4. Empirical Results and Discussion 
In this section, we study the effect of transparency on the political budget cycle empirically. Interestingly, 
there already exists an implicit prove of our hypothesis by Persson & Tabellini (1990) and Brender & Drazen 
[21]. Both papers find the absence of an electoral cycle if they restrict the sample to industrialized countries 
which are according to our finding also more transparent than developing countries. However, we show that the 
existence of cycle is not only dependent on the state of the economy but rather on transparency. By studying the 
debt levels, we find for G7 countries and Australia perfect mitigation of the debt cycle over time (Figure 1). 
While the ups and downs are almost unchanged, the standard deviation and amplitude are declining over time. 
 
Figure 1: PBC of G7 Countries and Australia, Debt Levels, 1981-2010; Source: OECD, author’s calculation. 
All transparency indicators demonstrate that this is mostly the case for the G7 countries and Australia 
because they are also leading in terms of transparency. Therefore, we split the data in G7 including Australia and 
non-G7 countries – later so-called ‘other-countries’. Table 1 contains the results. Firstly, we look to the mean 
values of the public deficit, debt and expenditure in respect to GDP. Comparing G7 including Australia and the 
other-countries shows the expected result. The last two rows in Table 1, represent information about the 
development of transparency, over time and across both country groups. 
To demonstrate that the ups and downs are mitigated, we compute the standard deviation and amplitude of 
the cycles. In almost all cases we find smaller standard deviation and amplitudes in countries that have higher 
values in terms of transparency. Unfortunately, only the expenditure amplitude is significantly at a 1 percent 
level. Thus the first impression indicated by Table 1 is not necessarily statistically significant for all measures. 
Looking to the other-countries, the declining trend is negligible or insignificant. From previous empirical studies, 
we know that public expenditure and deficit are the key variables. A close look to the dynamics of transparency 
demonstrates the difference between G7 including Australia and other-countries. Finally, this finding confirms 
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our hypothesis and is even statistical significant.1 The mean value of the transparency is not only significantly 
higher, it is also less volatile for G7 countries and Australia. 
 
Table 1: Development of Key Indicators - Mitigation of Political Business Cycle; Source: Author’s calculations.
 
To further check our results, we use a unique and new measure which is Google search data. We estimate 
panel regressions together with the Google data. Generally, all evidence confirms our findings above even if the 
results are just weakly significant. We show that the rather weak significance has to do with the rather recent 
developments of e-governance, e-participating. Thus to obtain more robust and long-run measures we do need 
long-time series which are unavailable today.  
According to Da, Engelberg & Goa [22], Google search data can be used as a measure for attention. Google 
data are only available since 2004. Based on these Google time series, we estimate a factor model first and 
develop for every country a special Google factor. Again, we separate the data between G7 including Australia 
and other-countries. Finally, we compute the mean, the standard deviation and amplitude of the Google searches 
(Figure 2). For all countries, the Google factors indicate that online attention declines over time. Both the solid 
and dashed blue curve represents the mean attention for G7 including Australia and other-countries respectively. 
Not surprisingly at the beginning the mean attention is higher for G7 including Australia but only until 2009. 
Notably since then, the mean attentions have similar levels for all governments in general. This remarkable 
development is an indication that public transparency was higher in the past for the G7 countries and Australia, 
however assimilated to other-countries in the recent years. Since the search numbers are not the number of 
absolute searches rather relative numbers, it is not astonishing that the numbers decline as more people search 
via Google. Today the online search is undoubtedly higher than 10 years ago. The standard deviation and 
amplitude of Google have thus declining trends for both groups of countries. Finally, a striking pattern is the 
peak in the dashed curves between 2009 and 2010. This time period is the so-called ‘Great Recession’ in the 
macroeconomics literature. The two years signal the global financial and economic crisis which was almost as 
severe as the ‘Great Depression’ in the 1930s. Interestingly, public attention to smaller countries during that time 
period was significantly higher in comparison to the G7 countries and Australia. 
Next, we estimate a regression model to confirm the previous findings. We check the data by doing some 
regressions to cross-check. In Table 2, we estimate the public debt-to-GDP in respect to the independent 
variables public expenditures, revenues, disposable income, nominal and real GDP, unemployment and an 
election-year dummy variable. The data ranges from 1970 to 2012. We split the sample into three models: Model 
1 all countries; Model 2 G7 countries including Australia and Model 3 other-countries. 
                                                          
1 Further statistical details are available upon request from the authors. 
1980-1989 1990-1999 2000-2010 1980-1989 1990-1999 2000-2010
Mean -4.572 -3.820 -2.888 -1.920 -2.146 -1.034
Std. Dev. 3.512 2.940 2.642 4.554 3.375 4.873
Amplitude 9.719 9.160 7.630 16.597 12.691 25.010
Mean -0.471 0.161 -0.360 -0.019 -0.460 -0.039
Std. Dev. 10.682 9.489 6.270 9.516 9.832 11.572
Amplitude 23.696 25.949 17.410 42.537 49.704 58.133
Mean 19.248 18.855 19.365 13.667 18.678 19.261
Std. Dev. 2.856 2.938 2.351 9.989 5.661 4.703
Amplitude 8.518 9.268 7.625 33.293 21.147 16.378
Mean 0.239 15.260 0.160 13.202
Std. Dev. 0.329 3.342 0.000 7.328
Amplitude 0.803 9.647 0.470 25.518
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Figure 2: Google Search (G7 and Australia solid and other countries dashed curves), 2004-2014; Source: Google Trend, 
author’s calculation. 
In general, the coefficients have the expected signs. For instance look at the coefficient for unemployment. It 
is positive and significance at 1 percent. This means that the higher unemployment leads to higher public debt 
which is an obvious relationship due to more unemployment expenditures. Similar findings are for public 
expenditure and disposable income. The negative signs for nominal GDP and real GDP are again expected. GDP 
is in the denominator of the debt-to-GDP ratio. Public revenue has an unexpected sign. However, the positive 
sign is a common finding in public finance literature due to a political economy argument. Every monetary unit 
of tax revenues finds almost automatically a spending purpose. Thus consolidation of public finance does not 
work with more revenues it only works with less revenues. This is a robust empirical finding in the literature [7]. 
The election dummy variable is not significant. This is not unsurprising in the literature again. Overall, the three 
models have high R-squared and therefore they sufficiently explain the dynamics. 
 
Table 2: Political Business Cycle I; Source: Author’s estimation. 
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3.846*** 5.517775*** 3.085929***
Revenues 36909.85 129307.1 -1555.752
4.146*** 5.510447*** -1.565488
Disposable Income 11.39 5.76094 0.755026
9.739*** 2.878273*** 10.38638***
Nominal GDP -9118.96 -4396.042 -207.0887
 -7.720***  -2.212449** -0.350564
Real GDP -1.74 -0.379926 -0.607137
 -5.698*** -0.772855  -5.988803***
Unemployment 15861.30 103343.2 3713.84
6.137*** 2.845757*** 3.615824***
Election Dummy 16974.08 19458.2 69.80796
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N countries 31 8 23
R-squared 0.9200 0.94034 0.92849
F-statistic  140.3263*** 132.8475*** 129.0024***
Note: Time series form 1970 to 2012. Numbers below the coefficients are t-values with 
signficant levels. *** significant at 1%,  ** significant at 5%, and  * significant at 10%.
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Let me summarize the main findings. First, transparency is higher in G7 countries including Australia. 
Second, transparency is mitigated, measured by the amplitude of the public deficit cycle, over time. It is 
interesting that the recent financial and economic crisis in the years of 2007 to 2008 had massive effects on 
public deficits in the other-countries as already noted earlier. But despite the crisis our results are robust and 
move in the right direction. Of course, our study has limitations. Most of the limitation can be solved and is a 
topic of future research. One issue is the short time series in particular for transparency or e-governance data. 
Another issue is that the election dummy is not significance as expected from theory. This is however similar to 
many empirical studies in this field. Fortunately, this is not a major weakness in this paper because our question 
is rather different. We were interested in the impact of and the mitigation of the amplitude and standard 
deviation of budget cycle over time. 
5. Conclusion 
As demonstrated in the paper on hand, the level of transparency influences the magnitude of the political 
budget cycle. In the course of time, the political cycle is mitigated through an increased transparency. G7 
countries including Australia are obviously more advanced with regard to e-governance and e-participation and 
therefore have a higher public transparency in their procedures. Consequently, the findings are more significant 
for this set of countries. We extended the existing research questions and through using new data sets during our 
empirical analysis we can proof our new model, including its inherent theoretical proposition. Going forward 
into the future, the used Google data will stimulate more empirical work.  
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